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Ever since I began teaching international law in the late 1950s I have been
interested in the ways international treaties and custom are reflected in national
legal orders. Joseph Gold's worldwide surveys of the application of the
International Monetary Fund Agreement in national courts, which have appeared
over the years with a regularity of the changing seasons, have proved a treasure
trove of significant practice in a newly emerging field. These essays, although
indispensable, have been mere episodes in Sir Joseph's oeuvre. His commen-
taries and analyses of modern international financial law, characterized by a
carefully controlled prescriptive orientation, have influenced greatly the working
of the International Monetary Fund. He has succeeded, where many have failed,
in fusing effective practice with scholarship of the highest order. As most
eminent lawyers, a poet at heart, may he continue his rich, productive life for
many years to come! It is a rare pleasure for me to be able to offer a contribution
in honor of this outstanding citizen of the European Community and my loyal
friend.
I. The System at a Glance
The contemporary European system for conducting foreign affairs is unique.
In the European Community of twelve embracing more than 320 million people,
there is a complex division of foreign affairs powers between the Member States
and the Community institutions. Although they remain sovereign states, the
Member States share their authority over economic and monetary policies with
the Community. They retain full control of their armies and defense; until
mid-1987 they also fully controlled their diplomatic policies. Thus in this
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system, foreign affairs are conducted neither strictly by states, nor by the
Community; rather some affairs-primarily defense-are conducted by individ-
ual states alone; some-such as diplomatic policy-by states in consultation with
each other within the European Political Cooperation framework; some-such as
the foreign trade policy-by the Community alone as an entity; and some-
primarily those exceeding the Community authority under its constituent
treaty-by the Community together or in parallel to the states. In some contexts
the Community has replaced the Member States-as within GATT for most
purposes-and in others-as in a number of multilateral treaties-it appears as
an additional person in the international arena.1
The European integration movement has been compared to the never-ending
process of building a medieval cathedral: 2 spurts toward heavenly heights
alternating with stagnation, followed by new leaps upward. The purpose of this
essay is to analyze the latest "spurt" in the process, the adoption, in the context
of the "Europe 1992" project, of the Single European Act of 1986, as it
concerns the foreign affairs system.
II. On the Origins: The European Parliament's
Scheme and the "Europe 1992" Project
The European Economic Community (EEC) was successful in removing,
ahead of the 1970 deadline, the internal tariff barriers and establishing a common
external tariff as the principal instrument of its common trade policy toward the
outside world. Community market organizations have replaced national agricul-
tural regulations. Progress was made toward the free movement of services,
companies, and capital, and a common competition policy. Nevertheless, a great
number of nontariff barriers and other obstacles to the creation of a genuine home
market' remained; and, except for the limited European Monetary System, little
was achieved toward an effective coordination of national economic and
monetary policies. By the mid-seventies and early eighties the pace of the
development slowed down considerably. Most of the institutional energy was
absorbed by disagreements over the budget, the expensive agricultural policy,
and the negotiations for enlargement of membership from the original six
(France, German Federal Republic, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg)
to nine (United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland), ten (Greece), and finally twelve
(Spain and Portugal). Equally important, economic recession with high inflation
and unemployment made it difficult for governments to make the concessions
necessary for further advance. The Community law-making machinery, seriously
1. For a detailed treatment, see Stein with Henkin, Towards a European Foreign Policy? The
European Foreign Affairs System from the Perspective of the United States Constitution in I
INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW Book 3, at 3-82 (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe & J. Weiler eds. 1986).
2. J. PELKMANS & A. WINTERS (with H. WALLACE), EUROPE'S DOMESTIC MARKET 1 (1988). See
generally 1992: ONE EUROPEAN MARKET? (R. Bieber, R. Dehousse, J. Pinder & J. Weiler eds. 1988).
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hampered by the unanimity practice in the Council, ground almost to a halt.
Economic structures became, if anything, more rigid as European companies
faced increased competition from Asia and the United States, especially in the
high technology sectors. International investment seemed to turn its back on the
Community.
3
Several initiatives sprang up to combat the "Eurosclerosis" and revive the
movement toward European unity. A series of reports and declarations at the
highest levels of government held out the bright, albeit ambiguous, vision of a
European Union.4 It was, however, left to the European Parliament, directly
elected since 1979, to give concrete substance to the European Union concept in
a draft treaty approved on February 14, 1984. That scheme would provide for
gradual transfer of competencies from the intergovernmental arena to Commu-
nity discipline and thus would transform the Community into a substantially
more integrated system.
5
Parallel to this ambitious political enterprise was the move initiated under the
leadership of the French President of the Community's executive Commission,
Jacques Delors, and broadly supported by European business circles. The focus
of the "Europe 1992" project has been not on far-reaching institutional restruc-
turing but rather on breaking down the regulatory, tax, and other barriers that have
obstructed the building of a home market, at a tremendous cost to governments,
enterprises, and the public. This cost, and the potential benefits from removing
the internal barriers., were quantified in a monumental research project commis-
sioned by the Community. 6 The linchpin of the vigorous campaign has been the
Commission's White Paper on "Completing the Internal Market" of June 1985,
offering a detailed legislative program of some 300 measures (later pared down
to 279) to be in place by the year 1992. 7
It was the European Parliament's intention to circumvent the procedure for the
amendment of the Community treaty, which would require a formal approval by
the national governments. 8 The Parliament had hoped that its draft would be
referred directly to the national legislative bodies and approved by them as a new
3. M. CALINGAERT, THE 1992 CHALLENGE FROM EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY'S INTERNAL MARKET 6-8 (1988); J. PELKMANS & A. WINTERS, supra note 2, at 1-3, 6.
4. De Zwaan, The Single European Act: Conclusion of a Unique Document, 23 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 747, 747-48 (1986).
5. 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 77) 33 (1984).
6. Even granting "a fairly broad margin of error," the report projects an increase in the
Community's GDP of about 4-7%, creation of 1.8 million new jobs, reduction of unemployment of
1.5 percentage points, average reduction of consumer prices of 6.1% (cooling inflation), a decrease
in the public budget deficit of about 2.2% GDP and improvement in the Community's external
balance of up to 1% of GDP. P. CECCHINI (with M. CATINAT & A. JACQUEMIN), THE EUROPEAN
CHALLENGE 1992-THE BENEFrrs OF A SINGLE MARKET 97, 103 (J. Robinson Eng. ed. 1988).
7. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market (White Paper
from the Commission to the European Council, Milan, June 28-29, 1985), COM (85) 310 final
(Brussels, June 14, 1985).
8. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 236.
WINTER 1989
980 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
European constitution. The governments, however, refused to accept this
revolutionary idea. Nevertheless, the Parliament's work provided the major
impetus for the calling of an intergovernmental conference, which, however, did
not consider the Parliament's proposal. Instead the conference produced drafts of
two separate instruments, a treaty amending the three constituent Community
treaties and a treaty providing a normative basis for the European Political
Cooperation (EPC) mechanism, as it has evolved on a voluntary basis since
1970. After considerable controversy, however, a consensus was ultimately
reached to fuse the two drafts into a single treaty, a symbolic gesture toward the
idea of a European Union comprising both economic and political elements.
Some governments objected to including a reference to European Union in the
title, and this explains why the treaty is called "Single European Act of 1986."9
The Act, little more than debris from the European Parliament's scheme, has
been the subject of criticism both because it has not gone far enough toward a
"European Union," and because of the many ambiguities. 1
0
On the positive side, a new deadline of December 31, 1992, is set for the
completion of the internal market as "an area without internal frontiers"; the
law-making process is facilitated by the removal of the unanimity requirement in
the Council, particularly in matters relating to the internal market (except for tax
matters, movement of persons, and workers' rights); the influence of the
European Parliament on legislation is modestly strengthened by a procedure for
a "second reading"; l and the Community competence in "second generation
policies," environment, research, and technology, is confirmed. Only the future
will tell whether the broad text on monetary policy and economic and social
"cohesion" will lead to concrete action. Beyond the incorporation of EPC, the
Act contains only a few specific provisions concerning the conduct of foreign
affairs.
9. Single European Act [SEA], BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 2/86 (effective July 1, 1987). See
also Decision adopted by the Foreign Ministers on the Occasion of the Signing of the Single
European Act, containing a series of implementing details, 19 BULL. EUR. COMM. 1986/2, at 115-16
[hereinafter Decision]. The Danish Government was not prepared to accept the term "European
Union" while other governments felt that the Act does not advance unity enough to warrant the title.
Jacqud, EActe unique europden, 32 REv. TiM. DR. EUROP. 575, 580 (1986). The preamble to the Act
speaks of the will "to transform relations ... into a European Union."
10. European Parliament Resolution of Jan. 16, 1986, 29 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 36) 144
(1986); Jacqud, supra note 9, at 580; Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the "Single European
Act", 24 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 9, 11 (1987) (viewing the Act as "fundamentally deceptive"). For
a response and defense of the Act, see Ehlermann, The Internal Market Following the Single
European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 361 (1987); see also Nuttall, European Political
Cooperation and the Single European Act, 5 Y.B. EUR. L. 203-32 (1986).
11. Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, Implications of the Single Act for the European Parliament, 23
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 767, 779-86 (1986). The Act also provided for the establishment of a court
of first instance (with appeal to the Court of Justice of the Communities) to deal with cases involving
complaints of Community staff against Community institutions and with competition cases. Single
European Act [SEA], supra note 9, arts. 4, 11 and 26. See Council Decision of Oct. 24, 1988, 31
O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 319) 1 (1988).
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HI. The European Political Cooperation
A. How MUCH UNIrry?
The dialectics of unity and separateness are dramatically apparent in the
introductory common provisions of title I of the Act: "The European Commu-
nities and European Political Cooperation shall have as their objective to
contribute together to making concrete progress towards European unity, (in
French, 'Union europgenne')" but each is to continue to operate under radically
different and separate regimes. For the Community this regime is the Community
Treaties as modestly amended in title II of the Act; for EPC it is title III,
confirming and supplementing the procedures agreed in specified reports and
"the practices gradually established" since 1970. Article 1 names specifically
the reports of Luxembourg (1970), Copenhagen (1973), London (1981), and the
Solemn Declaration on European Union (1983). 12
Along with EPC, a practice has evolved for the Heads of State or of
Government to meet periodically as "the European Council" in order to give
highest level political guidance "from the summit" on both Community and
EPC matters. Like EPC, the European Council has been given a treaty
foundation in the "Common provisions" of title 1. 13 It is to "bring together" the
Heads of State or of Government and the President of the Commission; and they
"shall be assisted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and by a Member of the
Commission," as has been the custom in the "common law" of the past.
However, the European Council has not been made an institution of the
Community, nor is it mentioned in title III dealing with EPC. Since nothing is
said of its functions, its role presumably will continue as determined by the
documents and practice incorporated by article 1.14
I have dealt with the working, accomplishments, and problems of EPC since
1970 elsewhere 15 and I shall limit myself here to some observations on title III
of the Act proper. That title, as we shall see, offers more or less comprehensive,
albeit quite general, rules to govern EPC, so that the incorporation of the
previously evolved practices may be viewed as redundant and conceivably cause
difficulties in case of a conflict between these written rules on one hand and past
practices on the other. However, the reference to practices may help to fill any
gaps that might appear in the application of the Act. In case of an imaginary
conflict, the provisions of title III would prevail.
12. SEA, supra note 9, art. 1.
13. Id. art. 2.
14. Id. art. 3(2).
15. Stein, European Political Cooperation (EPC) as a Component of the European Foreign
Affairs System, 43 ZErscHRiFr FOR AusLAxmsci-s OFF IFNTCS RECHT UND VOuERREcirr 49 (1983)
and sources cited therein. For an informative update, see Brickner, European Political Co-operation:
Danish Perspective, 5 Y.B. Eur. L. 191-202 (1986). See also EUROPEAN POLMCAL COOPERATON IN THE
1980s (A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger & W. Wessels eds. 1988).
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B. THE OBLIGATIONS
Two semantic features, each pointing in an opposite direction, are symbolic of
the underlying compromise. The concept "European foreign policy" replacing
"common external policy" used in an earlier proposal points toward more unity;
the addressees of the obligations, on the other hand, are the "High Contracting
Parties" rather than the "Member States," indicating the separateness. 1
6
There is no obligation to put in place "a European foreign policy," only to
"endeavor jointly to formulate and implement" it. 17 This formulation, broad and
noncommittal as it appears on its face, seems nevertheless to represent a step
forward from the earlier concept of coordination of foreign policy views,
attitudes, and positions. More specifically, the parties undertake "to inform and
consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest," a somewhat
broader clause than an earlier EPC text. 18 They are to ensure that their combined
influence is exercised "as effectively as possible through coordination, the
convergence of their positions and the implementation of joint action." '1 9
Although they remain ultimately free to determine their individual national
policy stance, they undertake to consult before their final decision, to take "full
account of the positions of the other parties," and to give "due consideration to
the desirability" of the "common European positions"; and such positions are
to constitute "a point of reference" for their national policies. 20 Longer-term
planning is contemplated rather than merely spasmodic reaction to crises of the
day that had characterized EPC particularly in the earlier years: the parties are
gradually to develop "common principles and objectives." 21 A concomitant
negative undertaking obliges the parties to avoid any action or position that
would "impair[] their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations
or within international organizations."
22
Understandably, title III does not define further the concept of "foreign policy
matters of general interest on which consultation is required." In the past, as I
have indicated in my earlier writing, a number of foreign policy issues were at
16. Jacqud, supra note 9, at 610; Lodge, The Single European Act: Towards a New Euro-
Dynamism?, 24 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 203, 217-19 (1986). The two components of the Act were
drafted in two different committees and there was no inclination to reopen the text. See infra note 29
on the inconsistency. However, the words "being members of the European Communities" were
added on the first occurrence of the "High Contracting Parties" (art. 30(1)). Nuttall, supra note 10,
at 210.
17. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30(1); Lodge, supra note 16, at 217-18 (that this is more than a
semantic difference).
18. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 2(a). "[lImportant questions of foreign policy of interest for the
twelve as a whole" appeared in the 1981 London report and the 1983 Solemn Declaration on
European Union. J. DE RuYT, L'AcrE UNIQUE EUROPtEN 230 (1987).
19. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 2(a).
20. Id. art. 30, 2(c), paras. 1, 3.
21. Id. art. 30, 2(c) para. 2.
22. Id. art. 30, 2(d). This is the so-called "Falkland clause." Nuttall, supra note 10, at 213. See
also art. 30, 7(a).
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least initially excluded from EPC by a common understanding (e.g., apartheid in
South Africa).23 No such exclusion is mentioned here. The only reference to the
scope of EPC is the specific inclusion of "the political and economic aspects of
security," again a compromise solution (actually adopted in practice since 1981),
between those, such as Italy, which pleaded for inclusion of additional aspects of
defense, and those strongly opposed (particularly Ireland, also Greece and
Denmark).24
Perhaps the most controversial point of the negotiations was the degree of EPC
links with the "rejuvenated" Western European Union, to which only some, but
not all, parties belong (and which was favored by Italy and France), and with
NATO, of which Ireland is not a member and France does not participate in its
integrated commands. The final neutral formula adopts the posture of the EEC
Treaty on this issue; it makes it clear that the individual parties are free to
continue to cooperate with the two institutions but does not envisage any EPC
role. 25
C. INSTITUTIONAL ASPEcrs
Institutional arrangements, involving exclusively national diplomats, have
now been defined in more or less specific terms. The principal EPC "organ" is
the twelve "Ministers for Foreign Affairs," in reality a conference of the same
men or women who sit in the general Council of the Community. The initial
taboo against consecutive meetings of the Community Council and the EPC
conference that was discarded some years ago is now formally removed, and the
Commission's full participation is confirmed. 26
Unanimity ("common agreement') has been the rule in EPC, but during the
negotiations for the Act, Italy, mindful of the difficulties in reaching unanimity,
proposed "a principle of consensus respecting the majority opinion.' Greece, on
the other hand, opposed any restraints on the right to dissent and to block the
"consensus." The final text enjoins the parties "as far as possible, [to] refrain
from impeding the formation of a consensus and the joint action." 27 Jacqu6
interprets this subtle formula as retaining the principle of consensus but
recommending the dissenting minority to abstain. He is, however, correct in
23. Stein, supra note 15, at 55-56.
24. Expressly included in this article is the maintenance of technological and industrial
conditions necessary for security and the obligation to work to that end both at the national level, and
where appropriate, in "competent institutions and bodies," meaning Community institutions, which
some delegations insisted could not be mentioned directly in a security context. Nuttall, supra note
10, at 212. J. DE RuYT, supra note 18, at 236-37; SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 6(a), (b).
25. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 6(c). See EEC, supra note 8, art. 233.
26. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 3(a), (b). On the "taboo," see Stein supra note 15, at 53,
specifically footnote 14. On the venue of the EPC meetings, see section IV of the Decision, supra
note 9, at 116. On languages, see id. section V.
27. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 3(c).
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pointing out the danger of the common positions being weakened by a number
of reservations, as foreshadowed in an extreme form by certain deviant attitudes
of Greece.28 In any case, the move from unanimity to consensus may be of some
importance since consensus could harbor opposition that would surface under a
unanimity rule.
The government of the party that holds the rotating Presidency of the
Community Council is identified as the "Presidency of European Political
Cooperation" and, as was the case in the past, it is made responsible for
initiating action, "representing the positions of the Member States" in the
outside world and preparing and convening the meetings. 29 It also supervises
the Political Committee, composed of directors of the political departments in
the national Foreign Ministries, which is the principal second level mechanism
with the task of giving impetus, maintaining continuity, preparing the
discussions of the Ministers, and directing various working groups.3 °
Under the Political Committee, another group of national diplomats, the
"European Correspondents' Group," monitors the implementation of EPC and
studies "general organizational problems. '"3' Although the Act makes no
mention of it, national officials and groups have been linked by a special, coded
telex system ("COREU, correspondence europ~enne").
A quasi-institutional element has emerged in practice in the form of the
organized cooperation of the ambassadors of the Member States posted in third
states and at the seats of major international organizations, with the ambassador
holding the Presidency of the Council acting as spokesman. The Act adopts, and
calls for an intensification, of this form of cooperation. 32
The only "revolutionary" change is the addition of a Secretariat, a much
contested issue in the past both as to its location and its function. It is seated in
Brussels (since France ceased to insist on Paris) and it has auxiliary duties of
assisting the Presidency. 33 A senior Italian diplomat was appointed Secretary
General and five diplomats are seconded to his staff for six-month terms--a
compromise between the French conception of a substantial Secretariat and that
28. Jacqud, supra note 9, at 611. See J. DE Ruvf, supra note 18, at 234-35 (curiously
sympathetic to the Greek position).
29. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 10(a), (b). For the practical arrangements made to alleviate the
administrative and other burdens of the Presidency, see Stein, supra note 15, at 54-55. Note the use
of the "Member States" rather than "the High Contracting Parties" here and also in SEA, art. 30,
10(d), indicating inconsistency in drafting.
30. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 10(c), (d), (f). The Presidency, at the ministers' and political
directors' level, is assisted by representatives of the preceding and succeeding Presidency in contacts
with nonmember governments, the so-called "Troika formula."
31. Id. art 30, 10(e). The Political Committee' or the Ministers must be convened within
forty-eight hours at the request of at least three "Member States." Id. art. 30, 10(d).
32. Id. art. 30, 9. The modalities of this cooperation are set forth in some detail in section II of
the Decision, supra note 9, at 115-16.
33. Id. art. 30, 10(g). For detailed provisions, see section III of the Decision, supra note 9, at
116.
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of a low profile." 34 Secretariat members do not have the status of European
officials but are given diplomatic immunity, which enhances their position
somewhat.3 5 It will be interesting to observe whether this new factor, combined
with the formalization of the institutions in a legal instrument, will change the
chemistry of the process, and contribute to a bureaucratization or "legalization"
that is feared by some commentators. 36
Until the establishment of the Secretariat, EPC did not have any institution of
its own; groups of national diplomats conducted all of its business. Grabitz
suggests that in a political-sociological sense, the Act has given rise to a
composite organization, "a confederation without any name," uniting the three
Communities and European Political Cooperation. He rightly concludes, how-
ever, that neither the composite creature nor EPC alone possesses the minimum
characteristics required for organizations with international personality and legal
capacity.
37
D. FORMS OF ACTION
The parties are to "endeavour to adopt common positions" in international
institutions and in international conferences; when only some, but not all, parties
take part they "shall take full account" of the positions agreed in EPC; a
"political dialogue with third countries and regional groupings" is to be
organized whenever necessary. The formulation of the last-mentioned clause was
influenced by the relationship with the Central American countries. 38 Except for
the representational responsibility in relation to third countries given to the
Presidency,39 these are the only functions dealing with the EPC's links to the
outside world.
The external manifestations of the EPC process have appeared in the form of
declarations following the meetings of the Ministers or the Heads of Govern-
ments, d6marches with a third state, diplomatic missions entrusted to the
President-in-Office, or common positions adopted in international fora. Beyond
that-since EPC has had no instrumentalities of its own-it has had to rely for
implementing action on individual governments or on the Community employing
its own powers. As an example, at the outbreak of the Falkland war, an economic
34. Europe, Agence internationale d'information pour la press, Luxembourg-Bruxelles, No.
4458 (N.S.), at 3 (Dec. 24, 1986).
35. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 11.
36. Jacqud, supra note 9, at 609.
37. Grabitz, Die Einheitliche Europaische Akte: Rechtliche Bewertung, 9 INTERGRATION 95, 96
(1986), quoted in Glaesner, The Single European Act: An Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FORDHAM INr'L
L.J. 446, 452 (1987).
38. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 7, 8. The "common positions" in international institutions and
conferences are limited to "the subjects covered by this Title," thus excluding monetary and
economic matters. Nuttall, supra note 10, at 213.
39. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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embargo against Argentina was agreed upon in EPC but it was put into effect by
the Community, employing its common trade policy power. The Act has not
brought about any change in this respect.
4 0
E. ON CONSISTENCY BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND EPC PoLIcEs
In view of the "common objective" mandated for the Community and EPC,
it is logical for the Act to require that the policies resulting from the two
processes must be consistent. This is perhaps the only unqualified, albeit by its
nature quite broad, obligation written in the Act. It is the Presidency and the
Commission that are given "special responsibility" for ensuring the
consistency.4 1 No mention is made of the European Council, which in the past
has been perceived as the ultimate coordinating forum, but there is no evidence
of an intention to discontinue this practice. By virtue of article 31, however, EPC
is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities,42 which means that a controversy over possibly conflicting
policies cannot be resolved through the ordinary Community judicial process.
It is conceivable, for instance, that consensus on political and material support
for a third state is made impossible in EPC by the opposition of a single member,
while the Community Council voting by qualified majority, approves a financial
aid measure in favor of the same state despite the negative vote of the identical
opponent.43 Again, a dispute may arise whether a novel subject, such as an
antiterrorist measure impinging on movement of workers, falls within the
competence of the Community or should be dealt with by national authorities
pursuant to an agreement reached in EPC. Past experience with disputes over the
scope of the Community's treaty-making power suggests that such controversies
may also pose uncertainties for the third states concerned. Although the Court of
Justice would not be able to adjudicate such disputes, it retains its authority to
define the scope of the Community's powers and interpret the constituent
Community Treaties: obviously in exercising this authority it cannot be required
to ignore EPC.
The question might also arise as to the alternative means of dispute settlement
in case of a deadlock over the consistency issue that cannot be resolved through
negotiations between the parties and institutions concerned. One must assume
that by excluding any recourse to the Court of Justice, the Member States are no
longer bound by the undertaking in article 219 of the EEC Treaty not to submit
40. Stein, supra note 15, at 61-68.
41. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 5. Both the British and the Franco-German drafts, which served
as the principal bases for the negotiations, placed responsibility for ensuring consistency on the
Member States themselves, but "this was thought to be insufficiently operational." Nuttall, supra
note 10, at 211.
42. SEA, supra note 9, title IV, art. 31.
43. Krenzler, Die Einheitliche Europaishe Akte als Schritt auf dem Wege zu einer gemeinsamen
europiischen Aussenpolitik, 21 Euao. R. 384 (1986).
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a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of that Treaty to any
tribunal other than the Court of Justice. That means, in theory at any rate, that
such normal means of dispute settlement as third-party conciliation or arbitration
would become available to the Member States and the Community." Yet,
recourse to such external proceedings would appear paradoxical and is most
unlikely in a substantially integrated system such as the Community.
Whatever may be its practical implication, the exclusion of the Court is further
evidence of the member governments' passionate attachment to national sover-
eignty over foreign policies and their aversion to any "judicialization" of the
diplomatic processes. This opposition in principle may have been reinforced by
the distrust of the Court in some quarters, due to its consistently broad
interpretation of the Community's independent foreign affairs powers at the
expense of national treaty powers.45
IV. More "Democratization": The European Parliament
Title II of the Act purports to increase somewhat the influence of the European
Parliament on lawmaking in the Community by introducing a new "cooperation
procedure" with the Commission and the Council. The procedure, which still
falls short of "co-decision," applies principally to legislation designed to
complete the internal market. 46
In the field of foreign affairs, the Act confirms, but does not modify
appreciably, the Parliament's participation in the EPC mechanism, as it has
evolved over the years: The Parliament is to be "closely associated" with EPC;
the Presidency shall keep it regularly informed of the foreign policy issues
47pending before EPC and ensure that its views are duly taken into consideration.
At the occasion of the signing of the Act, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
adopted a decision specifying the modalities of the dialogue between the
Parliament and the Presidency: presentation of a program at the beginning of
each Presidency's six-month term and of a report at the end of the term, an
annual written report on the progress of EPC, the Presidency's participation in
the Parliament's general debate on foreign policy, informal colloquy four times
a year between the Presidency and Parliament's Political Affairs Committees,
answers to parliamentary questions and resolutions, etc.48 De Ruyt reports that
the effort of the Belgian and other delegations to provide for an annual meeting
between the Parliament and all the Foreign Ministers (rather than with the
Presidency only) failed because the majority was afraid that such meeting would
44. See generally Freestone & Davidson, Community Competence and Part Ill of the Single
European Act, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 793, 795-800 (1986).
45. Stein with Henkin, supra note 1, at 19-22, 43-51.
46. Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, supra note 11, at 767.
47. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, 4.
48. J. DE Rutfr, supra note 18, at 242; Decision, supra note 9, section I, at 115.
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publicly expose divergent views among the Ministers. 49 The limitation in the
past practice to inform the Parliament through its Political Affairs Committee
appears to have been eliminated so that the information process may include the
plenary as well.5 °
Two innovations of some importance signal a qualitative, albeit limited,
upgrading of the Parliament's powers from purely advisory to normative. In the
first place, the Parliament was given the power to approve or disapprove, rather
than to give only a nonbinding opinion, on the admission to the Community of
new members. 5' This may prove of some practical significance in view of the
recent application for full membership by Turkey and the lively debate on the
desirability of EEC membership in Norway, Austria, and some other states
members of the European Free Trade Association.
Again, the Parliament was given a similar power of veto with respect to the
conclusion of "association agreements" such as the wide-ranging Lom6 Con-
vention concluded by the Community with sixty-six Pacific, Caribbean, and
African states. 52 These agreements, according to article 238 of the EEC Treaty,
remain subject to a unanimous vote in the Community Council. The new power
of the Parliament, however, does not extend to other agreements, such as the
crucial trade agreements falling within article 113 that require only a qualified
majority vote rather than unanimity in the Council. Because of this more liberal
voting requirement, and since the content of the "association agreements" is not
defined in article 238, the Member States in the Council have shown a distinct
tendency to classify proposed agreements as falling within article 238, which
gives each Member a veto in the Council, rather than an agreement under article
113. s 3 Ehlermann suggests that this tendency will now be reversed since the
Member States-choosing the lesser of the two "evils"-may prefer action
under article 113 to the new complication arising out of the Parliament's power
of co-decision. Moreover, if EEC article 238 should be interpreted in the light of
the judicial doctrine of parallelism between internal and external powers of the
49. Id.
50. Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, supra note 11, at 787.
51. SEA, supra note 9, art. 8 (amending art. 237, EEC Treaty). Parliament must act by an
absolute majority of its members.
52. Id. art. 9. A Committee report calls for extending the new power to trade and cooperation
agreements and for revising the procedures to ensure that the Parliament be consulted before the
initiation of the negotiations, and it suggests that the Parliament must be in a position to lay down
conditions to its assent. 1988-1989 EUR. PARL. SEss. Doc. A 2-0086-88, Report drawn up on
behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the Role of the European Parliament in the field of
foreign policy in the context of the Single European Act (Rapp. Mr. L. Planas Puchades) (May 26,
1988). See also EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, RuLEs OF PROCEDURE rules 32-35 (4th ed. 1987).
53. For a perceptive analysis, see Ehlermann, L'Acte unique et les compftences externes de la
Communauti: un progrgs? in RELATIONS ExTR~MuRES DE LA COMMUNALrrt EuR PtaNNE T MeCrHt
ImtRmR: AsPEcTs JURIDIQUES ET FO NCIONNELS [hereinafter RELATIONS EXTRIEursES] 79, 89 (P.
Demaret ed. 1988).
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Community, 54 as granting the Community the internal power to implement an
association agreement by its own legislation, the Parliament would be able for
the first time to claim the authority of full co-decision in the Community's
internal law-making process. This would constitute "an unexpected victory" for
the Parliament, exceeding by far its competence under the new "cooperation
procedure" mentioned earlier. 55 At least some Member States, however, are
likely to resist any such interpretation with great vigor.
In any event, the two new additions to the Parliament's powers are likely to
induce the Council and the Commission to maintain still closer contact with the
Parliament in order to avoid the risk of a veto of either a membership application
or an association agreement negotiated with a third state or international
organization. The "voice of the people" is marginally strengthened-at some
cost, perhaps, of the efficiency of the process.
V. Research, Technology, Environment: International Aspects
Apart from title III on EPC, foreign affairs are mentioned expressly, albeit
incidentally, in the context of the Community policies on research, technology,
and environment. 5 6 In these areas whose true importance has become apparent
in the last decade only, the Community has been active as promoter and
regulator. Yet, except for the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (article
55) and the Euratom Treaty (article 7), there was no specific legal basis for
Community power in these fields. The EEC institutions had to draw on the implied
powers in article 235, analogous to the "necessary and proper power" clause in
article I of the Constitution of the United States. To be adopted pursuant to this
article, a measure must be shown to be necessary to attain, "in the course of the
operation of the common market," one of the Community objectives, and it must
be approved unanimously in the Council. Thus in order to fit an environmental
protection measure within the strictures of this article, the Commission had to seek
a justification in terms of the economic objectives of the EEC treaty; the Com-
mission's rationalizations have become increasingly strained.
The Single Act amends the EEC Treaty to bring these areas expressly within
the Community competence. It thus removes the need for the Community
institutions to rely on article 235. Moreover, in the field of research and
technology, once the Council approves unanimously a multiannual framework
54. Ehlermann, supra note 53, at 89-90. The above doctrine was articulated by the Court of
Justice of the Community in Commission v. Council (the ERTA Case), 17 E.C.R. 263 (1971), 10
COMMON MKT. L.R. 335 (1971).
55. Ehlermann, supra note 53, at 89-90. The claim is reminiscent of the holding by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (conclusion by the United States of an
international agreement with Canada provided the Congress with power to legislate which (at the
time) it would not have had in the absence of the international agreement).
56. SEA, supra note 9, art. 24 (adding new title VI to part II of the EEC Treaty), supra note 8.
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program, the specific measures of cooperation with third countries, including
international agreements to be concluded in accordance with the standard
treaty-making procedure, 57 may be adopted by qualified majority in the Council.
This liberalization of the voting procedure, however, is not carried over into
the environmental field. In that field, "[w]ithin their respective spheres of com-
petence," the Community and the Member States are to cooperate and make
arrangements with third countries or international organizations, but unanimity in
the Council is the general requirement here. Nevertheless, the Council is expressly
authorized to "define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a
qualified majority," including the conclusion of international arrangements.58
In the past, a controversy has often arisen over whether a proposed interna-
tional agreement fell within the treaty-making power of the Community or of the
Member States. To protect national power the Act stipulates that the Community
shall act only where the desired objective of protecting the environment can be
attained better at the Community level than by national action ("the subsidiarity
principle"); more specifically, even when the Community acts, Member States
remain free to introduce more stringent measures "compatible with the Treaty."
This ambiguous effort to preclude or limit the accepted preemptive effect of
Community law has been criticized for allowing geographic fragmentation of
Community territory through divergent national environmental regulations.
Substantial flexibility allowing for divergent climatic and other conditions is
clearly desirable. The particular language of the Act, however, justifies concern
about the preservation of the independent treaty power of the Community and the
supremacy of treaties concluded by the Community over national law, as defined
by the Court of Justice. An interpretative declaration attached to the Act was
designed to alleviate that concern. 59 Considering the declaration and the clause
in the Act mentioned above that the Community and the Member States act
"within their respective competence" and that national measures must be "com-
patible with the Treaty," one must conclude that although the Members may adopt
or maintain national measures, once the Community decides to cover a specific
aspect by a regulation or in the context of an international convention, any national
legislation must be consistent with the common action. 60 In any event, the Court
of Justice will have the last word on any controversy of this type.
57. EEC, supra note 8, art. 228. Ehlermann considers the reference to EEC art. 228 superfluous
on its face and speculates about possible reasons for it. Ehlermann, supra note 53, at 84.
58. SEA, supra note 9, art. 24, title VI, inserting art. 130 S, para. 2, in the EEC Treaty, supra
note 8.
59. Declaration [on Article 130 R of the EEC Treaty] Re paragraph 5, second subparagraph
attached to SEA reads: "The Conference considers that the provisions of Article 130 R (5), second
subparagraph [concerning agreements with third parties] do not affect the principles resulting from
the judgment handed down by the Court of Justice in the AETR case." SEA, supra note 9, Final Act,
BULL. EUR. CoMM., Supp. 2/86, at 24.
60. Glaesner, supra note 37, at 458. See also Ehlermann, supra note 53, at 86-87. The author
raises a pertinent question whether the "cooperation procedure" with the Parliament which applies,
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VI. Other Aspects Affecting Third Countries or Their Nationals
Several provisions of the Act are of direct interest for third states or their
nationals. Thus, the unanimity requirement in the Council is replaced by a
qualified majority vote for extending the benefits of the liberalization of the
cross-frontier supply of services to non-Community nationals, for coordination
of exchange policies between the Member States and third countries, and for any




The easing of the procedure for modification of the common customs tariff,
which was generally viewed as indispensable, appears to be the only specific
provision dealing with the Community's common trade policy toward third
states. One might have expected that, along with the completion of the internal
market, the Act would provide a deadline for filling in the many remaining gaps
in the Community's trade policy. Individual Member States currently maintain as
many as 1000 quantitative or other restrictions on imports from third states,
including "voluntary" export restraint agreements and industry-to-industry
agreements, aimed largely at imports from Japan, the newly industrializing
Asian countries, the nonmarket states of Eastern Europe, and in some instances
(such as quotas in the General System of Preferences) at Third World imports as
well.62
These restrictions, whether or not conforming to the EEC Treaty, are
inconsistent with the home-market concept and require national border controls
inside the Community that the Commission's White Paper insists should be
abolished. To complete the Community trade policy it would be necessary either
to phase out the national measures or perhaps replace at least some of them (e.g.,
those concerning Japanese cars or textiles generally) with protective arrange-
ments adopted by the Community itself. Clearly, the governments were not
prepared to enter this thorny thicket in the context of the negotiations for the Act.
Nor is there any mention in the Act of moving the control over the entry of third
country nationals to the external frontier of the Community. Such a decision
would require Community-wide agreement on such matters as visas, crime,
terrorist, and drug controls.
63
inter alia, to international agreements on research and technology is the appropriate method for the
Parliament's participation in Community treaty-making. Id. at 90.
61. SEA, supra note 9, art. 16(1), (3), (4).
62. M. CALINOAERT, supra note 3, at 83. See also J. PELKMANS & A. WiNTERs, supra note 2, at
7, 101-103; Europe, supra note 34, Oct. 14, 1988, at 6, No. 4873 (N.S.) (Mr. Horst G. Krenzler,
Director General for Foreign Relations at the Commission).
63. See generally Mattera, L'achevement du marchg interieur et ses implications sur les relations
extdrieures in RELATIONS Ex iuaCfuREs, supra note 53, at 217-18. In the General Declaration on
articles 13 to 19 of the Single European Act, adopted at the signing of the Act, the parties declared
that nothing in the Act shall affect their right to take whatever measures they consider necessary for
controlling immigration from third countries, combatting terrorism, crime, drug traffic, and illicit
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VII. Concluding Observations
The Single European Act is a bizarre conundrum in international law, a
creature of a diplomatic bargain. It is a treaty joining amendments of three earlier
treaties with "provisions" incorporating an ongoing regime based on political
understandings. Its contribution toward the declared objective of "European
unity" in the sphere of foreign affairs at any rate is little more than marginal.
The Act does not provide for an institutionalized European foreign policy.
Quite to the contrary, it reaffirms the stark separation between the diametrically
different regimes dealing with foreign trade and diplomatic policies. Moreover,
the Act perpetuates the dysfunctional separation of foreign diplomatic and
defense policies. Little more than a "personal union" of the principal actors and
loose cooperative arrangements link the two regimes, the substantially integrated
Community and the pristinely intergovernmental EPC. This inherently unstable
situation is the result of an uneasy compromise between forces pressing for
further integration and the governments and their bureaucracies, unwilling to
relinquish their traditional powers.
If one takes a minimalist point of view, however, the Act represents an
incremental advance:
a. By turning a fragile political undertaking to consult on foreign policy into
a treaty obligation, albeit a widely open-ended one, the Act strengthens
the commitment and provides a modicum of additional restraint on
unilateral action. It has been suggested, on the other hand, that the
conversion of the political commitment into a treaty obligation, and
generally the codification of EPC in a normative instrument, may mean
that any further evolution of the mechanism may be achieved only by a
treaty amendment-a view that is hardly persuasive. When the parties
intended to block any institutional change through means other than treaty
amendment-as they did with reference to economic and monetary
policy-they said so expressly in the Act. 64 Whether it is wise to
delegitimize in advance any evolution through means less burdensome
than a "constitutional" amendment is another question.
b. The Act confirms that the Community and EPC are coordinate and
membership in both is indivisible. A withdrawal from EPC is no longer a
matter of terminating a mere political pledge and would raise questions of
treaty violation.
trade in art works. See also the Political Declaration by the Governments of the Member States on
the free movement of persons pledging cooperation of the Member States, "without prejudice to the
powers of the Community," particularly as regards entry, movement, and residence of third country
nationals and as regards combatting terrorism, crime, drug traffic, and illicit trade in works of art and
antiques. SEA, Final Act, BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 1/86, at 24, 25.
64. SEA, supra note 9, art. 102A, 2, inserted by art. 20 of the Act. This "blockage" is probably
due at least in part to constitutional concerns in Denmark and elsewhere. Glaesner, supra note 37,
at 451.
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c. The objective of "European unity" is given a treaty basis and that may
assist the Court of Justice in its teleological interpretation of the
constituent treaties. Moreover, the codification of the Community objec-
tives in the areas of research, technology, and environmental protection
confirms the Community foreign affairs powers in these disciplines.
d. The Act provides a normative basis for the Commission's standing to
participate in EPC although the scope of its authority remains undefined.
As in past practice, the Commission may influence the outcome, but it is
not one of the actors counted for the purpose of consensus.
e. The upgrading of the powers of the European Parliament from mere
"advice" to obligatory "consent" with respect to admission of new
members and limited type of international agreement may prove impor-
tant if it serves as a precedent for extending the Parliament's voice in
treaty-making generally.
f. The newly introduced Secretariat should improve the continuity in the
EPC process although, as I mentioned above, some commentators fear a
bureaucratization of the mechanism whose principal virtue thus far has
been its flexibility. There is also a potential for friction with the
Commission, the Secretariat of the Council, and national diplomats.
g. Those "pro-Europeans" inclined to see the world through rose-tinted
spectacles may draw some comfort from the clause that commits the
parties in 1992 "to examine whether any revision" of the EPC mecha-
nism "is required." 65 Yet it proved impossible to provide that the revision
should be in the direction of a closer union.
The Act, as we have seen, has two principal facets: the incorporation of EPC
and the liberalization of the voting procedure in the Community Council,
designed to assure the completion of the internal market within the 1992
deadlines. The true impact on Europe's foreign affairs and its position in the
world will depend on the success of the "Europe 1992" enterprise. As of this
writing (March 1989), a surprising 47 percent of the legislation proposed in the
Commission's White Paper has been enacted by the Council.66 The remaining
proposals, however, that are still to be acted upon contain some of the pivotal and
most controversial items of the program, such as tax harmonization and complete
removal of national frontier controls inside the Community. Moreover, the
Council legislation in the form of "directives" must be transformed into national
65. SEA, supra note 9, art. 30, (12).
66. The measures approved include full liberalization of the free movement of capital, radical
simplification of customs procedures, substantial deregulation of road transportation, further
measures toward opening of the government procurement markets (including telecommunications),
a new method of harmonization of national technical regulations and standards, mutual recognition
of professional qualifications, first steps in liberalizing financial services and air transport. See
generally M. CALINOAERT, supra note 3, at 29-64; Report on the Progress required by Article 8B of
the Treaty (presented by the Commission), COM(88) 650 final (Nov. 17, 1988).
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legal orders by legislative or administrative action in the twelve Member States,
a process that has proved difficult and has required increasing intervention by the
Commission and the Court of Justice.67 If one assumes, nevertheless, that the
legal framework will be substantially in place as projected, the crucial factor will
be the response on the part of the economic actors. Will the European business
sector be ready to take advantage of the new opportunities offered by the vast,
substantially deregulated, highly competitive market, through imaginative trans-
border interactions? Will labor cooperate in the necessary, and at times painful,
restructuring of the industries? Will management be prepared to plan globally
using advanced information and technology systems? A revitalized Europe
would speak with greater credibility and its influence and bargaining power in the
international arena would increase measurably.
If one is inclined to take a benign view of the Single European Act, one may
say that it conforms to Jean Monnet's recipe for gradual integration: define in
clear terms the albeit limited goals to be achieved within specific deadlines that
are broadly acceptable at a given time, and add such institutional arrangements
that all agree are indispensable for achieving the goals. The assumption of the
"pro-Europeans" is that a united, even though substantially deregulated, market
will require more centralized decision making. The institutional deficiencies and
contradictions will be exposed and this will force the next phase in the building
of the European cathedral.
67. Commission of the European Communities, XXI General Report on the Activities of the
European Communities 1987, para. 92 Ct, (1988); Fifth Annual Report to the European Parliament
on Commission monitoring of the application of Community law (1987), COM(88) 425 final, Table
No. 6, at 52 (1988).
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